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WINTER 1965]
LABOR ARBITRATION - A NEW THEOLOGY
By HERBERT BURSTEINt
IJUME'S STRICTURE that Berkeley's philosophy was not only
thoroughly unanswerable but thoroughly unconvincing, serves
well as an introduction to the current eschatalogy of labor law. Like
the ebb and flow of the picketing-free speech dialogue, arbitration has
moved from judicial exile to grudging acceptance and now to a kind
of exalted status supported by a new jurisprudence fashioned by arbi-
trators and elaborated by the courts. Its theory and structure may be
summed up in a single phrase: all labor disputes, no matter how
frivolous, which arise during the term of a collective labor agreement
are arbitrable unless by the most explicit terms arbitration is foreclosed.
Distinctions between substantive and procedural arbitrability are rec-
ognized but disregarded by reading into the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act' a grand design for a federal labor policy erected on a bedrock
of arbitration. One court reads the signs this way:
The entire import of the Supreme Court cases beginning with
Lincoln Mills, through the trilogy of the Steelworker cases to
Drake . . . is that arbitration, when agreed upon by the parties,
is the best method for reconciliation of disputes arising out of
collective agreements. Where an arbitration clause admits of a
construction including the dispute in question within its ambit.
recourse to the courts before any effort is made to process the
dispute through arbitration is to be looked upon with disfavor.
A scholar explains that:
The meaning of the Steelworkers and Lincoln Mills cases
cannot, however, be limited to the specific holdings described
above or the many subsidiary findings and conclusions which are
contained therein. Rather, of equivalent importance was the
creation of an atmosphere in which the greatest values were placed
upon the peaceful settlement of disputes through use of machinery
designated by the parties for that purpose. To this end the liti-
gants, the arbitrators and the courts were encouraged to use
every available means to make the arbitration process effective. 3
t Partner in the firm of Zelby & Burstein, New York; A.B., 1936, Long IslandUniversity; LL.B., 1938, J.S.D., 1942, St. Lawrence University.
1. 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1947).
2. Belk v. Allied Aviation Service Co. of New Jersey, Inc., 315 F.2d 513, 517
(2d Cir. 1963).
3. Weiss, Labor Arbitration and the 1961-62 Supreme Court, 51 Ggo. L.J. 284,286 (1963).
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All that remains of the judicial function is the reserved power to
decide whether there is an agreement to arbitrate:
The Congress, however, has by Sec. 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, assigned the courts the duty of determining
whether the reluctant party has breached his promise to arbitrate.
For arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be re-
quired to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not
agreed so to submit.4
But this is a small role, indeed, since the slightest hint of an in-
tention to arbitrate, couched in the most amorphous terms, leads almost
inevitably to a reference to the arbitrator. This stems from the prin-
cipal "if in doubt, arbitrate"5 and the subordination of common law
principles governing the construction of contracts to the federal policy
which elevates arbitration from the status of a technique for settling
labor disputes to a philosophy. It may well be then, that an inquiry
into this subject is no more than an academic excursion into history.
I.
The origin of the current enchantment with arbitration is found
in the Lincoln Mills case.6 There, a labor contract prohibited strikes
and lock-outs during its terms and required that grievances be handled
under a specific procedure. After exhausting the grievance machinery,
the union demanded arbitration, and when the employer refused, a suit
was instituted in the Federal District Court to compel arbitration. The
Supreme Court addressed itself, first, to the jurisdictional question,
namely, whether Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act7
was merely jurisdictional or whether it was a "source of substantive
law." The Court concluded that Section 301 is "more than jurisdic-
tional - that it authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal
law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements and
includes within the federal law specific performance of promises to
arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining agreements. '"
II.
With this thesis as a cornerstone, a pyramid was erected and the
new structure was appropriately designed by a trilogy of cases.9 In
4. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582(1960).
5. Id. at 582-83.
6. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
7. 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) ; Wollett and Wellington, Federalism and
Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L. Rzv. 445 (1954).
8. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
9. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960).
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LABOR ARBITRATION
one case,' 0 an employee quit his job and received workmen's compen-
sation benefits on the basis of proof of permanent partial disability.
When the union demanded that the employee be restored to his job
under the seniority provisions of the labor agreement and the company
refused, a grievance was filed. The company declined to arbitrate, and
both the District Court" and the Court of Appeals12 sustained the
company's position.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding, in substance,
that where an agreement provides for the arbitration of all grievances,
a court is foreclosed from inquiring into the merits of the controversy.
A companion case'" involved a dispute over subcontracting. Here,
the labor agreement included both a broad arbitration clause and com-
prehensive "management prerogatives" provisions. The union's de-
mand for arbitration was rejected by the company, and, again, the
District Court 4 and the Court of Appeals 5 supported the Company's
stand. But the United States Supreme Court saw it differently.' 6 To
be sure, said the Court, the determination as to whether or not a party
has agreed to arbitrate is a judicial one, but, if the court finds that the
"reluctant party did agree to arbitrate"' 7 then:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of any interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute.'"
In short, unless precise and explicit language excludes a particular
grievance from arbitration, disputes "should be resolved in favor of
coverage."'" Conceivably, the absence of express exclusionary provi-
sions is not fatal if there is "most forceful evidence of a purpose to
exclude the claim from arbitration. 0 This suggests the possibility of
analysis of past bargaining history as a clue to intention, but few
courts have been persuaded to divert the judicial stream from the
allegedly calm seas of arbitration.
10. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., supra note 9.
11. The District Judge held that the employee was estopped from repudiating his
claim that he was permanently partially disabled and he granted the employer's motion
for summary judgment.
12. 264 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1959).
13. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960).
14. 168 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ala. 1958).
15. 269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959).
16. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960).
17. Id. at 582.
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 583.
20. Id. at 585.
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A recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,2
points out what appears to be the current trend. In that case, the pub-
lishers of three daily newspapers in Baltimore entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with the Baltimore Typographical Union No. 12
covering the terms and conditions of employment of workers in the
composing rooms. The agreement was to expire on December 31, 1964.
In April, 1964, a dispute arose between the parties, and the publishers
instituted an action under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Re-
lations Act to enforce the grievance procedures and arbitration pro-
visions of the agreement.
The facts involved were briefly these: one of the publishers, A. S.
Abell Company, had a composing room with twelve line-casting ma-
chines operated by perforated tape produced manually by typesetters.
Employees who operated the tape perforating units performed an
additional operation known as "justification and hyphenation." Abell
acquired an electronic computer which eliminated the manual function
of "justification and hyphenation." When the union was advised of
Abell's intention to operate the electronic computer, it contended that
under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the publishers
could not install the computer without bargaining about its installation
and use. They argued that the employment of the machines would
constitute "the use of tape not authorized by" the agreement. Abell
rejected the claim, asserting that it was not extending the use of tape
beyond the permissible contract limits and that the dispute concerning
the use of the electronic computer was subject to arbitration. The
pertinent portion of the agreement relied upon by the union was as
follows:
Section 3. In the event any Publisher shall introduce the
Teletypesetter Keyboard tape-perforator and operating units as a
means of producing type in their composing rooms the following
shall apply:
(k) Teletypesetter tape consisting of financial market quota-
tions and Major League Baseball box scores received over the
regularly leased wires of the Associated Press or the United Press
International may be used. All other teletypesetter tape shall be
perforated by employees covered by this agreement ...
21. A. S. Abell Co. v. Baltimore Typographical Union No. 12, 338 F.2d 190 (4th
Cir. 1964), 50 L.C. Par. 19,326. In its opinion, the Court reviews the following
authorities: International Union of Elec., R.&M. Wkrs. v. General Elec. Co., 332
F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Independent Petroleum Workers v. American Oil Co., 324
F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 377 U.S. 930 (1964) ; Independent Soap
Workers v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 314 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 807 (1963); Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company v. Communications
Workers of America, 310 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Ass'n of Westinghouse Sal. Emp.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 283 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1960).
[VOL. 10: p. 287
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In the event the Publishers, during the life of this agreement,
desire to extend the use of tape not authorized by this agreement,
they shall notify the union. Upon such notification the parties
shall, without undue delay, enter into negotiations for the purpose
of arriving at a mutual agreement concerning the matter, but
disagreement thereon shall not be subject to the Code of Procedure
or arbitration.
Section 5. This contract alone shall govern relations between
the parties on all subjects concerning which any provision is made
in this contract, and any dispute involving any such subjects shall
be determined in accordance with the Code of Procedure.
Section 8. . . . Both parties agree that whenever any differ-
ences of opinion as to the rights of either [Union and Publishers]
under the Agreement shall arise, or whenever any dispute as to
the construction of the contract or any of its provisions takes
place, such difference or dispute shall be promptly resolved in
the manner provided in this contract ...
Section 39 of the agreement required the arbitration of:
differences in the interpretation and enforcement of the terms of
this contract, including the question of whether, under Section 5,
the disputed issue is covered by the terms of this contract, and
including the interpretation of all language contained in this
contract.
When the matter came before the District Court, the union made
an offer of proof relating to the negotiations between the parties which
led to the drafting of Section 3(k). The proffer was rejected by the
District Court which held that the clause was ambiguous and hence,
referred the matter to arbitration. Upon appeal, the union contended
that proffered evidence of bargaining history was admissible. The
Court of Appeals, after reviewing the leading Supreme Court author-
ities (which dictate that disputes under collective bargaining agreements
are best resolved by arbitrators and not by courts) rejected the union's
claim that the bargaining in history was "forceful evidence" of an
intention to exclude the particular dispute from arbitration and ruled:
Such a contention ignores the teaching of Warrior & Gulf
which favors arbitration where doubts arise as to the meaning of
language used in the collective bargaining agreement, particularly
where, as in the present instance, the agreement is replete with
indications that the parties broadly agreed upon arbitration of
their disputes, and the exclusionary language of section 3(k) is
vague and ambiguous. If indeed the union has "forceful evidence"
of an exclusionary purpose this should be presented to the Board
of Arbitration which is expressly empowered to interpret the
WINTER 1965]
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agreement, "including whether under section 5, the disputed issue
is covered by the terms of this contract, and including the inter-
pretation of all language contained in this contract." It is the
Board of Arbitration who should make the determination of
whether the controversy is subject to arbitration.
Distinguishing cases to the contrary, the Court held that:
' * * in determining whether a dispute is subject to arbitra-
tion, evidence of bargaining history is admissible only where judi-
cial construction of the arbitration clause in question would not
involve the resolution of the underlying dispute. Since in this
case, in order to determine whether the dispute comes within the
exclusionary provisions of section 3(k) or the arbitration clause,
the court would necessarily have to determine the underlying
issues of whether Abel's contemplated use of the computer would
constitute an extension of "the use of tape not authorized by this
agreement . . ."
The lesson of the decision is clear: bargaining history is a matter
to be considered by the arbitrator and not the court and, notwithstanding
well reasoned decisions to the contrary, the opinion by the Court of
Appeals appears to be consistent with the contemporary view of the
role of the arbitrator vis-a-vis the Courts.
Another significant case22 was concerned with the discharge of
employees who left their jobs in protest against the firing of one em-
ployee. When the company refused to reinstate the workers, the union
sued to compel arbitration and succeeded in the court and before the
arbitrator. The company failed to comply with the award and the
union sought and obtained an order enforcing the award.23 The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding inter alia, that the expiration of the labor
agreement (which occurred between the time of the discharge and the
date of the award) rendered the award unenforceable.
The United States Supreme Court again reversed24 and enjoined
the federal courts from reviewing the merits of the award, even one
whose terms were plainly ambiguous.
The full sweep of the trilogy was elaborated in two principal de-
cisions of the United States Supreme Court. It had always been
assumed that the quid pro quo for the employer's agreement to arbitrate
was the union's forebearance from exercising the right to strike.
25
22. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960).
23. 168 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. W.Va. 1958), revised and modified, 269 F.2d 327
(4th Cir. 1959).
24. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
25. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957), but see Drake
Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery & Confectionery Workers International,
370 U.S. 254 n.7 (1962).
[VOL. 10: p. 287
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Hence, if a union struck in violation of a no-strike clause, it was rea-
sonable to assume that the correlative right to pursue arbitration was
abandoned. In Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery &
Confectionary Workers International,26 the Supreme Court said, in
effect, that where a strike occurs and the employer fails to assert that
the contract has been terminated, or at least evidences an intention to
forever abandon the obligation to arbitrate, it cannot be said that the
duty to arbitrate is conditioned upon the absolute observance, by the
union, of its no-strike pledge. Hence, when employees refused to work
and the union denied that it instigated or encouraged the work stoppage,
the employer's suit to recover damages for breach of contract was
stayed pending arbitration:
Arbitration provisions, which themselves have not been repudiated,
are meant to survive breaches of contract, in many contexts, even
total breach ... 27
Apart from termination of the entire agreement or express repudi-
ation of the arbitration provisions, when may an employer sue for
damages suffered by reason of the union's violation of a no-strike clause?
This happy possibility exists only when the right to invoke arbitration
is reserved exclusively to the union."8 Indeed, it is doubtful that an
employer who expressly terminates the entire agreement or claims the
right to "extinguish permanently its obligations under the arbitration
provisions ' 29 may frustrate arbitration if the arbitration clause is un-
restricted in text and scope and contemplates an agreement "to arbi-
trate all claims without excluding the case where the union struck over
an arbitrable matter.""0 It appears, too, that the duty to arbitrate may
be imposed upon an employer even where the labor agreement excludes
certain issues from arbitration and preserves the union's right to strike
over these."' To illustrate, when a labor contract provides that certain
bargaining issues not covered by the existing agreement may be pro-
cessed through the grievance machinery up to but not including arbi-
tration, and that the union may strike if the company refuses to submit
to arbitration, 2 a dispute relating to subcontracting (which is not a
subject covered by the agreement) may be held referrable to an arbi-
trator under an arbitration clause which purports to cover questions
26. 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
27. Id. at 262.
28. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
29. Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, 370 U.S. 254, 261 (1962).
30. Id. at 262.
31. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 573
(1960). (Concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan.)
32. See clause in Independent Petroleum Workers of America, Inc. v. American
Oil Co., 324 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1963).
WINTER 1965]
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of "applications or interpretations" or of "alleged violations" of the
agreement, if the union points to some clause of the agreement - i.e.,
the recognition provisions as a basis for its claim.33 Accordingly, the
right to strike may not be a barrier to arbitration."
III.
The hospitality accorded to arbitration is matched by the immunity
accorded to arbitration awards. It is clear that the standards by which
the validity of an arbitration award may be tested are, or ought to be,
provided by the Federal Arbitration Act.3" It is not enough that the
award appears irrational or directly in conflict with the clear and un-
ambiguous terms of the labor agreement. In the absence of fraud or
breach of duty by the union or a clear demonstration that the arbitrator,
exceeded his power, an award is unassailable.3 6 So long as the arbi-
trator's interpretation of the contract is not patently arbitrary or
capricious, it will be enforced.
7
IV.
Arbitration provisions bind not only the employer and union but
individual employees:
Where an arbitration clause can be construed to include the dispute
in question within its ambit recourse to the courts before any
effort is made to process the dispute through arbitration is to be
looked upon with disfavor.
38
Despite the provisions of Section 9(a) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, 9 the grievance and arbitration machinery cannot be
scrapped or avoided. An employee can neither compel arbitration nor
institute suit to vindicate a personal grievance or dispute. In Black
Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,"° an individual
employee, one Best, who alleged that he had complied with the pre-
33. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568(1960) ; National Tube Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 790 (1951) ; Celanese Corp. of America, 33
Lab. Arb. 925 (1959).
34. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
283 F.2d 93 (3rd Cir. 1960).
35. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947).
36. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
37. Marble Products Co. of Georgia v. Local 155, 335 F.2d 468, 50 CCH Lab. Cas.
19,164 (5th Cir. 1964).
38. Belk v. Allied Aviation Service Co. of New Jersey, Inc., 315 F.2d 513, 517
(2d Cir. 1963).
39. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
40. 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962) ; cf. Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F.
Supp. 728, 790 (D. Md. 1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 849 (1960).
994 [VOL. 10: p. 287
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liminary steps of the grievance procedure, demanded arbitration of an
alleged discharge. The employer then instituted a declaratory judg-
ment action against Best (and his union) for a decree that the dispute
was not arbitrable. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and
for an order compelling the plaintiff to submit to arbitration. The
District Court held that Best had no right to compel arbitration. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
District Court and held:
We conclude that the terms of the grievance procedure in the col-
lective bargaining agreement before us give the employee Best
no right to compel Black-Clawson to submit to arbitration, and
that this conclusion must be reached by applying federal law and
by resorting to reasoned state precedent for guidance. 1
The Court also referred to an earlier decision in Proctor & Gamble
Independent Union v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. 42 In that case, the
Court said:
The right to arbitrate under a collective agreement is not ordi-
narily a right incident to the employer-employee relationship but
one which is incident to the relationship between employer and
union. Under the collective bargaining agreement between the
parties, it was the union which had the right to take grievances to
arbitration, not the individual employees. See Black-Clawson Co.
v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 212 F. Supp. 818 (N.D.
N.Y. 1962).... The wording of the grievance clause as a whole
clearly indicates that only the union or the employer can demand
arbitration.4"
The governing principles are these:
It seems clear, therefore, that rather than conferring an indefeas-
ible right upon the individual employee to compel compliance with
the grievance procedure up to and including any arbitration pro-
vision, section 9(a) merely set up a buffer between the employee
and his union, "permitting" the employee to take his grievance
to the employer and "authorizing" the employer to hear and
adjust them without running afoul of the "exclusive bargaining
representative" language of the operative portion of section 9(a).
This construction also best comports with the structure of the
section. "The office of a proviso is seldom to create substantive
rights and obligations; it carves exceptions out of what goes
before." Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement." 69 Harv.
L. Rev. 601, 624 (1956).
41. Id. at 184.
42. 312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962).
43. Id. at 184-85.
WINTER 1965]
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As applied to the case before us, section 9(a) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, and its adoption by Black-Clawson and
the Union in their collective bargaining agreement, assured Best
the privilege of presenting his grievance to the employer even
without the cooperation of the Union, and with the consent of
Black-Clawson to have those grievances adjusted, so long as the
adjustment was not inconsistent with the terms of the collective
agreement. See Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, etc., 171 F.
Supp. 782, 791 (D. Md. 1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied 363 U.S. 849, 80 S.Ct. 1628, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1732
(1960); Arsenault v. General Elec. Co., 147 Conn. 130, 157 A.2d
918 (1960). See also General Cable Corp., 20 Lab. Arb. 443
(Hays, 1953). Best is therefore without power to compel Black-
Clawson to arbitrate the grievance stemming from his accusation
of wrongful discharge. The Union is the sole agency empowered
to do so by the statute and by the terms of the contract before us."
The rationale of this decision is the need to preserve the collective
bargaining status and integrity of the union. Thus, the Court said:
The Union represents the employees for the purposes of negoti-
ating and enforcing the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. This is the modern means of bringing about industrial
peace and channeling the resolution of intra-plant disputes. Chaos
would result if every disenchanted employee, every disturbed
employee and every employee who harbored a dislike for his em-
ployer, could harrass both the union and the employer by pro-
cessing grievances through the various steps of the grievance pro-
cedure and ultimately by bringing an action to compel arbitration
in the face of clear contractual provisions intended to channel the
enforcement remedy through the union. 5
The union, alone, may prosecute grievances to arbitration. Indeed, the
outstanding labor lawyer of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Goldberg,
suggests that the failure of the union to press a grievance forecloses both
arbitration and an action at law and this is particularly true where the
dispute is settled either by refusal of the union to process the grievance
or by reference to the procedure agreed upon by the parties:
A mutually acceptable grievance settlement between an employer
and a union, which is what the decision of the joint Committee
was, cannot be challenged by an individual dissenting employee
under section 301 (a) on the ground that the parties exceeded
their contractual powers in making the settlement.
46
44. Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 185-86
(2d Cir. 1962).
45. Id. at 186; See also, Cox, Rights Under A Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. Rzv.
601 (1956) ; Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration,
37 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 362 (1962).
46. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 352 (1964).
[VOL. 10 : p. 287
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Even the National Labor Relations Board, an agency hardly
distinguished by eagerness to surrender or share jurisdiction, will treat
arbitration, in some circumstances, as equal in effect. Section 10(a)
of the Labor-Management Relations Act" provides, in essence. that
the Board's power to remedy and prevent unfair labor practices is not
affected by any other means of adjustment established by agreement,
law or otherwise. Nevertheless, if an arbitration award meets certain
criteria of fairness and does not offend against the statute, the Board
will respect and give it effect and stay the exercise of its jurisdiction.48
However, the Board has begun to draw in the bit. In one case, the
Board acted on unfair labor charges filed by an employee who was
discharged for circulating a petition seeking the removal of union
officers, notwithstanding that the grievance and arbitration procedures
were not exhausted;9 the Board acted where the grievance machinery
was set in motion and then abandoned; 50 and it acted again where
the arbitration procedures did not appear to adequately protect the
employee who complained of a discriminatory job referral program
under a union hiring hall arrangement."
VI.
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,52 adumbrated the role of
arbitrators in resolving the substantive merits of the controversy and
the decision in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston was the final fulfill-
ment. Simply stated, an arbitrator is empowered to decide both sub-
stantive and procedural issues. So-called "procedural arbitrability",
like substantive arbitrability, is grist for the arbitrator's mill. It is,
therefore, the arbitrator's function to decide whether an issue is
arbitrable and whether the demand for arbitration was properly made
or is time-barred. Clearly, where the issue of procedure is part and
parcel of the basic substantive issue, the arbitrator's judgment is
47. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
48. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955); Newspaper Guild of Buffalo,
118 N.L.R.B. 1471 (1957) ; Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local 546, 133 N.L.R.B.
1314 (1961); International Union, United Automobile Workers Union, 130 N.L.R.B.
1035 (1961).
49. Aerodex, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 50 L.R.R.M. 1261 (1964).
50. Electric Motors & Specialties, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 57 L.R.R.M. 1258
(1964).
51. Local 469 of the United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumb-
ing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States & Canada, 149 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 57
L.R.R.M. 1257 (1960).
52. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
53. 376 U.S. 543 (1963).
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supreme. The exceptions are two fold: first, where the procedural
issue is palpably unrelated to the substance of the dispute, and second,
when the complainant self-consciously abandons the procedural steps
or refuses to follow it.
54
CONCLUSION
Labor law is viable and the appearance of a fixed and immutable
body of law may yield to the reality of new judicial refinements and
commentaries. Until the full reach and dimensions of the federal sub-
stantive labor law is defined and described, the status of the collective
labor agreement as a constitution for industrial self-government con-
tinues to be uncertain, if not unreliable. In these circumstances, the
conception and drafting of a collective bargaining agreement calls for
the most precise exercise in language, a competent knowledge of de-
cisional precedents and a watchful eye on the courts and arbitrators.
Arbitration is a singularly effective adjunct of industrial labor re-
lations; it ought never to become a substitute for free collective
bargaining.
54. In re Long Island Lumber Co., Inc., ... App. Div. ... , (lst Dept.), 152
N.Y.L.J. 17 (1964).
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